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1. Introduction
The long-run relationship between the size of public sector and economic
growth remains an important accepted stylized fact in the literature of public
economics (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)). A simple explanation for the
long-run determination of public spending was proposed by Wagner (1883)
and it is known as Wagner's Law (henceforth WL). It states that the growth
of government expenditure is a consequence of the expansion of the state
produced by a country's social and economic development. The urbanization
and greater division of labour accompanying industrialization require, for
example, more government regulation and higher expenditure on contractual
enforcement and law and order. Other reasons are the growing need to ﬁnance
large-scale investments with public good characteristics (i.e., infrastructures)
and the supposed superior income-elasticity of publicly provided goods and
services, such as education, welfare, but also national security or defence.
A large number of studies focus on an empirical assessment of WL from
diﬀerent perspective and with diﬀerent techniques. See, for recent reviews,
Durevall and Henrekson (2011) and Kuckruck (2014). Most of the empirical
literature focuses on developed or developing economies over relatively short
time spans, generally starting from the 1960s. The majority compare the re-
sults for industrialized and emerging economies in order to make a statement
about the relation between development level and WL, although there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between a modern state in the 19th century and recent
developing economies, in terms of culture, institutions and conception of the
state activity.
By contrast, the analysis of WL in a long-run perspective, on a single coun-
try or countries with similar social, economic and political conditions has
attracted much less attention. Few studies analyse very long time spans and
generally reject WL. Henrekson (1993) and Bohl (1996) ﬁnd no support for
WL in Sweden from 1861 to 1990 and in the United Kingdom from 1870 to
1995, respectively; Ghate and Zak (2002) do not ﬁnd any empirical evidence
in the United States from 1929 to 2000; Durevall and Henrekson (2011) ﬁnd
direct evidence in favor of WL only for Sweden and the United Kingdom in
a time period from around 1860 to 1970. There are, however, shorter time
spans during which WL holds. For example, Oxley (1994) for the United
Kingdom, Thornton (1999) for Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom, and Durevall and Henrekson (2011) for Sweden
and the United Kingdom conﬁrm the validity of WL in a period of 50 years
preceding World War I. Recently, Kuckuck (2014) examines UK, Denmark,
Sweden, Finland and Italy, ﬁnding that a long-run equilibrium between pub-
lic spending and economic growth exists but WL has a higher validity during
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early stages of development.
The econometric techniques to study this topic concern: (i) explicit focus on
structural breaks to evaluate shifts in the long-run; (ii) tests for asymmetric
adjustment in the short-run diﬀerenting positive or negative deviations from
the trend; (iii) preliminary detection of potential outliers before proceding
to cointegration analysis (see Durevall and Henrekson (2011) for a recent
review). Here we aim at evaluating the presence of endogenous nonlineari-
ties within the analysis of the long-run relationship between the variables of
interest.
Particularly, the goal of our paper is to contribute to the analysis of WL
for the Italian economy, from its political uniﬁcation in 1861 to 2009. Italy
is a good case for study because it is a late-comer which caught up with
industrialization in the late 19th century and then exhibited an excellent
economic performance that enabled it to join the G7 group in the 1970s.
We consider the long span as the correct framework to test WL since it
enables study of the evolution of government expenditure in response to
country's social and economic progress, i.e. to the changes in demands and
needs of the society. However, during 140 years, Italy has experienced a
number of economic and socio-political potential sources of nonlinearities in
the data: the WWI and WWII, as well as the Great Depression, and the
socio-political turmoils in the post-war period. Such events might be causes
of diﬀerent asymmetric responses in government spending to variations in
national income. If this is the case, not taking into account those features of
the data might induce biased empirical results and misleading conclusions.
Actually, we ﬁnd the validity of WL over the period 1862-2009, only when we
take into consideration strong asymmetric responses of government spending
during the WWI and WWII period. Robustness checks clearly recognize non-
linear behaviour of government spending driven by the explosion of military
expenditure.
The main contributions of the paper to the existing literature are the fol-
lowing. Firstly, unlike previous studies, we consider nonlinear cointegration
to validate WL. We show that for the Italian case strong support to WL is
found when nonlinearities are modelled. Hence, the presence of asymmetric
adjustments in the response of government spending may explain why the
bulk of empirical evidence concerning WL is inconclusive. Secondly, we ap-
ply the methodology by Hansen and Seo (2002) to incorporate the possibility
of threshold eﬀects in the cointegrating relationship, so that we nest linear
cointegration allowing the potential existence of one or more regimes. Fi-
nally, our paper also diﬀers from existing studies on Italy because it relies
on a new dataset recently provided by Italy's State General Accounting De-
partment containing data on total government expenditure. Concerning the
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GDP series, our dataset also makes use of the most recent series of Italy's
national accounts recently provided by the Bank of Italy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework
for the empirical analysis. Moreover, it outlines the nonlinear cointegration
model proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002). In Section 3 we describe the data
and comment on some stylized facts. Section 4 presents the empirical results.
In Section 5 we deal with some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Econometric Framework
In order to test WL, the literature uses diﬀerent functional forms linking
public spending and national income. This paper uses the following speciﬁ-
cation
gt = α + θ yt (1)
where g is the logarithm of total government expenditure in nominal terms
as a share of nominal GDP, and y is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.
The above formulation is probably the most common and the majority of
other models in the literature are simple reformulations of it (see Durevall et
al. 2011). Contrary to the alternative speciﬁcation that consists of total gov-
ernment expenditure and GDP, it has the advantage, by using real per capita
GDP, of better considering a nation's prosperity and the spending capacity
of its citizens. Moreover, the use in Equation (1) of total government expen-
diture as a share of GDP instead of real total government expenditure con-
siders the possibility that diﬀerences in productivity growth of government
and private sector production lead to an increase in government spending
due to "Baumol's disease"1. Now, Equation (1) models the evolution of the
demand for public goods and services in the long-run through the coeﬃcient
θ that according to WL should be greater than zero. In this case, the govern-
ment expenditure increases faster than GDP, i.e., government expenditure is
income-elastic, or in other words, it is a superior good. Cointegration and
Granger causation oﬀer an econometric framework to estimate Equation (1).
Note that WL requires that if a long-run relationship exists, i.e., that g and
y are cointegrated, also g must Granger-cause y and not vice versa.
However, if previous works have massively employed cointegration analysis,
only some of them have adequately addressed the issue of regime change and,
1"Baumol's disease" involves a rise of wages in jobs - i.e., in the government sector -
that have experienced no increase of labour productivity in response to rising wages in
other jobs - i.e., in private sector production - which experienced such labour productivity
growth. The rise of wages in jobs without productivity gains is caused by the requirement
to compete for employees with jobs that experienced gains and hence can naturally pay
higher salaries (Baumol (1967)).
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generally speaking, of any asymmetric movements in the relationship between
the variables. If this is the case, it might be of some importance to allow in the
same cointegration framework the possibility of linear and nonlinear eﬀects.
This could be potentially meaningful to capture the underlying dynamics
of the data. Note that in the case of non-cointegrating variables, threshold
vector autoregression models (TVAR) (see Tsay (1998) or Ferraresi et al.
(2015) for an application) might be suitable. Given our speciﬁc relationship
in (1), we consider the approach developed in Hansen and Seo (2002) where
a two-regime threshold VECM model is proposed as a convenient method
to combine nonlinearity and cointegration. In particular, the model allows
for nonlinear adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. In fact, although a
linear VECM model assumes a constant adjustment speed towards a long-run
equilibrium, the threshold cointegration approach holds that error correction
occurs depending on the threshold. Hansen and Seo (2002) deﬁne a two-
regime nonlinear VECM of order `+ 1 as follows:
∆xt =
{
A
′
1Xt−1(β) + ut if wt−1(β) ≤ γ
A
′
2Xt−1(β) + ut if wt−1(β) > γ
(2)
with
Xt−1(β) =

1
wt−1(β)
∆xt−1
∆xt−2
...
∆xt−`
(3)
where xt is a p-dimensional I(1) time series with one p × 1 cointegrating
vector β, wt(β) = β
′
xt denotes the I(0) error correction term. In our case,
with the previous notation, the vector of interest will be xt = (gt yt)
′
. The
error ut is assumed to be a vector martingale diﬀerence sequence with ﬁnite
covariance matrix Σ = E(utu
′
t). Then, γ is the threshold parameter and the
coeﬃcient matrices A1 and A2 govern the dynamics in the two regimes. The
threshold eﬀect has content if
pi0 ≤ P (wt−1 ≤ γ) ≤ 1− pi0 (4)
where pi0 > 0 is a trimming parameter, which is set to be 0.05. Estimation
of this model is performed using Maximum Likelihood (MLE) under the
assumption that the errors are iid Gaussian.
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Under this framework, we apply the test proposed by the same authors to
verify the presence of threshold. Particularly, we test a null of linear cointe-
gration (VECM) versus an alternative of threshold cointegration (two-regime
VECM). It is a LM test of the following form:
SupLM = sup
γL≤γ≤γU
LM(β˜, γ) (5)
where β˜ is the null estimate of β, the search region [γL, γU ] is set so that γL
is the pi0 percentile of w˜t−1 and γU is the (1 − pi0) percentile. This imposes
constraint (4). The SupLM statistic has a nonstandard asymptotic distribu-
tion. As discussed in Hansen and Seo (2002), the ﬁxed regressor bootstrap of
Hansen (1996, 2000) can be used to calculate asymptotic critical values and
p-values as well as residual bootstrap technique. This framework seems to be
the correct one to consider potential nonlinear eﬀects between our variables
of interest if statistical testing produces such evidence.
3. Data
We use annual time series data of Italy's central government spending that
comprise the years 1862-2009. Data on total government expenditure and
its national defence item are at current prices and are drawn from the se-
ries that have recently been provided by Italy's State General Accounting
Department (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato 2011). Spending refers to the
total payments disbursed in the year, which have been obtained from the
ﬁnal budget of the state2. Our data diﬀer from those of the two most re-
cent papers that test WL for Italy. In fact, Magazzino (2012) relies on the
Informative Public Base (IBP), a database developed by the Bank of Italy
that covers the shorter 1960-2008 time span and refers to the expenditure
of the Italian public administration as a whole, i.e., it includes not just the
expenditure of Italy's central government but also the expenditure of local
governments (regional, provincial and municipal administrations). Our series
diﬀer also from those of Kuckuck (2014) who uses data drawn from Mitchell
(2007) for the years 1850-1995 and from Eurostat for the years 1996-2010.
These data are provided by Italy's State General Accounting Department,
but, diﬀerently from ours, they refer to the expenses accrued and not to the
actual payments in the ﬁscal year. For GDP at current prices and real per
capita GDP (2010 prices) we rely on the new series of Italy's national ac-
counts that have been recently provided by the Bank of Italy (Baﬃgi (2011)).
2From 1884 to 1964 Italy's ﬁscal year ran from July 1st to June 30th. Data have
been attributed to the solar years by adding half of the expenditures disbursed in two
consecutive ﬁscal years and assuming an equidistribution of the expenditure over each
ﬁscal year.
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Population data are from the Ricostruzione della popolazione residente e del
bilancio demograﬁco database (Istat (2012)).
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the ratio of total government expenditure
to GDP compared to real per capita GDP on the full sample3. It shows
that between 1862 and the mid-1890s, the total government spending and
real per-capita GDP show very similar trends. During this period the invest-
ments in the railways was particularly signiﬁcant and spending for education
and culture also increased constantly from Uniﬁcation to the WWI. In the
ﬁrst ﬁfty years following Uniﬁcation, Italy's total government spending in
real terms increased slowly, on average: between 1862 and 1913 total gov-
ernment spending was around 10% of GDP, but the participation in WWI
led to a drastic increase of total government spending to the 35% of the
GDP. In the years after the conﬂict, government spending sharply dropped
again, in 1926 settling to the pre-war values compared to the GDP: defence
spending dropped, while investments in public works and other economic
interventions resumed. Participation in WWII led to an another drastic in-
crease of government spending, from just over 10% to more than 45% of the
GDP. After the defeat of WWII, Italy was prohibited from reconstructing its
own independent military power. This led to a drastic reduction in defence
spending, as can been seen from Figure 2. On the other hand, economic and
social components of expenditure started to increase: infrastructure, welfare,
and redistribution by the state. Under pressure from the expansion of suf-
frage (universal suﬀrage was introduced in 1946), and, from the end of the
1960s, of an unprecedented wave of social conﬂicts, a progressive expansion of
welfare services to new social categories took place in Italy until a universal-
istic welfare system was introduced in 1978. Moreover, Italy's pro-American
stance during the Cold War and the possibility that the Italian Communist
Party (the largest Communist party in the Western world) might organise
a revolution meant that a large proportion of government expenditure was
allocated to national security. In the 1970s, this expenditure was further
increased to tackle political terrorism. Hence, between the end of WWII and
1963, public spending remained well below 25% of GDP while from the mid-
1970s state spending began to grow more rapidly than the GDP, reaching a
maximum peak of 44% in 1986 (see Figure 1). During recent years, the ex-
penditure share was more stable. Between 1980 and 2009, total government
expenditure actually grew less than proportionately to GDP. In particular,
from 1993, with a view to Italy's signing up to the single European currency,
3See Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) for a discussion of the role of government spending
of the main industrialised economies in the 20th century and Cohen and Federico (2001)
for an in-depth discussion of the Italian case.
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the imbalance of the national accounts began to be tackled, and clear re-
sults were seen in 1995, making decisive progress in 1997, when the deﬁcit
dropped. The preliminary analysis of the series suggests a long-run rela-
tionship between total government spending and national income with some
large deviations during the WWI and WWII period. This reinforces our idea
to take into account some large but transitory deviations from the common
long-run path of the variables.
4. Empirical Results
In this Section we explore the data to hand. Firstly, we conduct some prelim-
inary investigation on stationarity of the series and existence of cointegrating
relationship. Then, we test for the presence of nonlinearities in the data and
proceed with estimation of the parameteric model.
4a. Preliminary Analysis
To investigate stationarity of the two series of interest, we apply alternative
unit root tests. The ﬁrst test is the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller test
which considers a null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of
stationarity. The second is the modiﬁcation of the above test proposed by
Elliott (1999). The last is the KPSS test proposed by Kwiatkowski et al.
(1992) for the null hypothesis of stationarity versus the alternative of non-
stationarity. The results are reported in Table 1. Both tests lead us to
consider goverment expenditure and real per capita GDP as realizations of
I(1) processes. Thus in the subsequent analysis we will consider the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of both series, and preliminary summary statistics are given in
Table 2. Normality tests reject the null of normality in the data, and this
could be partially due to temporal dependence in the moments of the series
or to the presence of nonlinearities in the data.
Before proceeding further with the analysis, we search for the existence of a
cointegrating relationship between the two variables of interest. Note that, as
a preliminary condition for cointegration, we have already checked that the
two time series are integrated of the same order (I(1)). Next, we implement
the linear Johansen cointegration rank tests (Johansen (1988)), using 2 lags
in the VAR, as suggested by BIC criterion, and including an unrestricted
constant. As shown in Table 3, these preliminary tests easily reject the null
hypothesis of no-cointegration, indicating the presence of one cointegrating
relation. Therefore, we estimate the linear VECM, and the results are shown
in Table 4. Here the estimates indicate bidirectionality in the two variables
and this shows no evidence of the WL for this country. However, this could
be due to a misspeciﬁcation of the correct model owing to the threshold-
type nonlinearities present in the data. That is why we apply a threshold
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cointegration technique in what follows.
4b. Threshold Cointegration
Firstly, we test explicitly for the presence of threshold eﬀect under the null
hypothesis of linear cointegration for the complete bivariate speciﬁcation.
The ﬁxed regressor bootstrap and the residual bootstrap methods were used,
and both were simulated using 5,000 bootstrap replications. A lag lengh of
` = 1 in Equation (3) was selected, basing our choice on AIC and BIC criteria.
Table 5 reports the test results for the linear versus nonlinear cointegration
hypothesis, together with threshold and cointegrating parameter estimates.
The resulting LM statistic computed as a function of the threshold parame-
ter estimate γ is plotted in Figure 3. The ﬁxed regressor bootstrap method
reject the null at 5% conﬁdence level and the residual bootstrap method at
1%. Thus, the threshold cointegration model seems more appropriate to our
data than a linear one. In fact, neglecting the asymmetric adjustment may
lead to biased inferences and misleading conclusions. Hence the error correc-
tion mechanism diﬀers depending on deviations from the equilibrium below
or above the threshold parameter. So that, the ﬁrst regime (say, "normal")
corresponds to gt−1 − 0.501yt−1 ≤ −5.532 and the second regime (say, "ex-
treme") corresponds to gt−1 − 0.501yt−1 > −5.532. We also observe that
87% of all the observations belong to the ﬁrst regime and the remaining
13% to the second regime. Estimation is performed by MLE following the
grid-search algorithm proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002) over a 80 × 80
grid on the parameters β and γ. Table 6 reports estimated values of the
threshold VECM. There are three most signiﬁcant results. The ﬁrst is that
in "normal" times lagged values of real per capita GDP signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the dynamic behavior of the Italian economy, while in the "extreme" regime
government expenditure of the previous period tends to matter most. The
second result concerns the coeﬃcients of error-correction term wt−1 in the
two regimes. This term strongly suggests causality running from economic
growth to government activity. In fact, the negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant adjustment parameters in both government equations imply validity of
WL as GDP being a driving force of government expenditure. Note also that
the magnitude of the response of government expenditure is between 9 ("nor-
mal" regime) and 5 ("extreme" regime) times greater than the coeﬃcient in
the GDP equation. Finally, the last outcome concerns the estimated long-
run relationship between government expenditure and national income. In
fact it results signiﬁcantly greater than zero (p-value=0.009) suggesting that
government expenditure is income elastic, i.e a superior good, over the full
sample. In conclusion, all these results validate WL for the Italian economy
from 1862 to 2009. To allow visual interpretation of the results, the error
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correction mechanism is pictured in Figure 4. It can be noted that the strong
error-correction eﬀect for the two variables is depicted on the right-hand side
of the estimated threshold. On the contrary, it shows a ﬂat near-zero eﬀect
for real per capita GDP and slightly greater eﬀect for government expen-
diture on the left-hand side. Asymmetry shows a stronger error-correction
eﬀect in the "extreme" regime compared to the "normal" regime which is
driven by the public side of the economy. This ﬁnding seems to provide new
evidence of nonlinearities in the underlying parametric processes. Moreover,
the diagnostics reported at the bottom of Table 5 reinforce the evidence of
nonlinearity given that the null of equality of the dynamic coeﬃcients as
well as equality of coeﬃcients in the error-correction term are strongly re-
jected. Furthermore, we investigate the timing of the regime shift in the
cointegrating relationship. The estimated regime classiﬁcation according to
the threshold VECM is visually presented in Figure 5. Our estimated model
suggests that the economy happens to be in the "extreme" regime between
1915 - 1919 (with some follow-up in the 1921 - 1923) and between 1934 -
1945. These facts are in line with the preliminary inspection conducted in
Figure 2, pointing out a drastic increase in military spending in those time
spans.
5. Robustness
As discussed before, during the process of economic development of the Ital-
ian economy there is a tendency of goverment expenditure to grow relative
to GDP according to WL. However, this evidence clearly emerges only when
we take into account nonlinear adjustment of the variables to their long-run
growth path during the WWI and WWII period. In this Section, we conduct
two checks for correctness of our outcome. Firstly, we verify the linearity of
WL of public spending when the "abnormal" periods are excluded by the
data. Secondly, we tests the linearity of this relationship subtracting the
military spending from the total expenditure series. Particularly, we run the
linearity versus nonlinearity LM test on the two subsamples left when we
exclude periods which are sources of nonlinearity. Once we run the ﬁxed
regressor and residual bootstrap for the subsample 1862 - 1914 (1946 - 2009,
respectively) we obtain p-values equal to 0.39 and 0.054 (0.092 and 0.052,
respectively) which do not reject the null hypothesis of linearity at 5% sig-
niﬁcance level. Since the model especially captures the WWI and WWII, it
suggests military disbursement as a driving force for the government expen-
diture. If this is the case, once we subtract public spending on defence from
the total goverment expenditure, we expect to remove the source of nonlin-
earity in the data. Therefore, we construct a new variable as the natural
logarithm of the ratio between total government expenditure minus national
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defence expenditure over nominal GDP. We run again the linearity LM test
for the bivariate model and the p-values from ﬁxed regressor and residual
bootstrap are 0.26 and 0.105, respectively. This means that we do not reject
the linearity hypothesis at 10% signiﬁcance level, suggesting exactly military
disbursement as a driving force for the government expenditure. This ev-
idence reinforces the conclusion outlined in Section 4. The model for the
evolution of the demand of public services is basically linear according to
WL. The source of non linearities is large but transitory and it is simply due
to abnormal behaviour of the expenditure for national defence during the
WWI and WWII period.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we test the long-run tendency for Italian total government ex-
penditure to grow relative to per capita GDP over the period 1862-2009. We
ﬁnd evidence of a threshold cointegrating relationship between these variables
which turns out to be consistent with WL, given the diﬀerent adjustment
speeds to their long-run growth path. Asymmetric error-correction eﬀects
identify two diﬀerent regimes and the WWI and WWII years completely de-
scribe one of them. The abnormal response of government spending in the
latter regime is only due to the increase in defence expenditure during the war
periods. On the basis of these results, we conclude that the model for public
spending is basically linear and consistent with an expanding government
sector as the economy progresses.
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Figure 1: Total government expenditure as a share of GDP and real per capita GDP
(1862-2009).
Figure 2: Total government expenditure as a share of GDP and national defence expen-
diture as a share of GDP (1862-2009).
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Figure 3: Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic for the bivariate (government expenditure
and real per capita GDP) threshold cointegration model as a function of the threshold
parameter γ.
Figure 4: Variable response to error-correction. Variables are government expenditure
(g) and real per capita GDP (y).
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Figure 5: Timing of the realization of "extreme" regime obtained from the threshold
VECM in government expenditure (g) and real per capita GDP (y).
Series ADF t-tests ADF-GLS tests KPSS tests
tµ tτ tµ tτ ηµ ητ
g −1.541 [2] −2.977 [2] −0.511 [2] −3.002 [2] 3.349∗∗∗[2] 0.206∗∗ [2]
∆g −9.809∗∗∗[1] −9.775∗∗∗[1] −9.405∗∗∗[1] −9.471∗∗∗[1] 0.025 [1] 0.024 [1]
y 0.443 [2] −1.785 [2] 1.479 [2] −1.091 [2] 6.831∗∗∗[2] 1.046∗∗∗[2]
∆y −7.374∗∗∗[1] −7.461∗∗∗[1] −7.653∗∗∗[1] −7.485∗∗∗[1] 0.372 [1] 0.127 [1]
Table 1: Unit root and stationary tests for total government expenditure (denoted by
g) and real per capita GDP (denoted by y). The symbol ∆ denotes the ﬁrst-diﬀerence
transformation of the series. The symbol ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 99% conﬁdence
level, while the symbol ∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 95% conﬁdence level. Those symbols
refer to the choice of not rejecting the null hypothesis both for ADF (presence of unit root)
and KPSS (stationarity) tests. Numbers in square brackets refer to the selected lag order
for each statistics. Finally, tµ and tτ correspond to test statistics where the auxiliary
regression contains a constant and a constant and a trend, respectively; ηµ and ητ are test
statistics for level and trend stationary, respectively.
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Statistics ∆gt ∆yt
Mean 0.010 0.017
Standard deviation 0.139 0.049
Skewness -0.088 0.106
Kurtosis 3.645 10.118
J −B 81.551∗∗∗ 627.41∗∗∗
S −W 0.922∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗
Table 2: Summary statistics on ﬁrst-diﬀerenced series of total government expenditure
(g) and real per capita GDP (y). J −B and S −W denote the Jarque-Bera and Shapiro-
Wilk tests for the null of normality, respectively. The symbol ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance of
1% signiﬁcance level
Series gt yt
Trace test
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic p-value
None 0.1269 19.830 0.0092∗∗∗
At most 1 0.00006 0.0091 0.9240
Maximum Eigenvalue test
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen Statistic p-value
None 0.1269 19.821 0.0048∗∗∗
At most 1 0.00006 0.0091 0.9240
Table 3: Johansen cointegration rank tests (CE stands for Cointegrating Equation) based
on VAR(2) with unrestricted constant. The symbol ∗∗∗ denotes rejection of the hypoth-
esis at the 0.01 level. Both trace test and max-eigenvalue tests indicate 1 cointegrating
equations at 0.01 level.
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Variables ∆gt ∆yt
Cointegrating vector 1.0000 -0.5124
(0.0000) (0.0718)
Intercept -0.6953∗∗∗ -0.1909∗∗
(0.2039) (0.0741)
wt−1 -0.1186∗∗∗ -0.0349∗∗∗
(0.0342) (0.0124)
Table 4: Estimates of the linear VECM(1) with unrestricted constant for government
expenditure (g) and real per capita GDP (y). Standard errors are provided in parentheses.
The symbol ∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 99% signiﬁcance level and the symbol ∗∗ at 95%
signiﬁcance level.
Estimates
Threshold parameter estimate (γ) -5.532
Cointegrating parameter estimate (β) 0.501
Lagrange multiplier threshold test
sup LM value 20.082
p-value of ﬁxed regressor bootstrap 0.024
p-value of residual bootstrap 0.009
Table 5: Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for threshold cointegration between government
expenditure and real per capita GDP. The number of gridpoints for threshold and cointe-
grating vector is equal to 80. For p-values, the number of bootstrap replications is set to
5000.
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Variables 1st regime (87% obs) 2nd regime (13% obs)
∆gt ∆yt ∆gt ∆yt
Intercept -0.136∗∗ -0.015 -0.834∗∗∗ -0.162
(0.055) (0.014) (0.219) (0.089)
wt−1 -0.781∗∗ -0.079 -4.395∗∗∗ -0.839
(0.334) (0.081) (1.143) (0.458)
∆gt−1 0.105 0.029 0.631∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.154) (0.028) (0.094) (0.061)
∆yt−1 -0.350 0.495∗∗∗ -0.019 0.179
(0.198) (0.074) (0.433) (0.307)
Wald test equality dynamic coefs. 19.661 (p-value: 0.001)
Wald test equality EC coefs. 18.923 (p-value: 0.001)
Table 6: Estimates of the threshold VECM for government expenditure (g) and real
per capita GDP (y). Eicker-White standard errors are provided in parentheses. In Wald
test diagnostics, the null hypothesis is equality of the dynamic coeﬃcients and of the
coeﬃcients on the error correction terms across the two regimes, respectively. The symbol
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 99% signiﬁcance level and the symbol ∗∗ at 95% signiﬁcance
level.
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